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NOTES
SUPERVISORY POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts invoke supervisory power to establish standards
of fairness in the administration of justice and to protect the integ-
rity of the judicial system.' The exercise of supervisory power can
dispose of the case before the court or produce a statement of
general applicability and future effect to implement court-pre-
scribed policy. 2 As a judicial construct devoid of constitutional or
statutory mandate, 3 however, supervisory power produces law that
1 The supervisory power of appellate courts encompasses a "general authority over the
administration of justice in the inferior federal courts; and has been regarded as a basis for
implementing constitutional values beyond the minimum requirements of the Constitution,
or at least affording a basis for their implementation on other than constitutional
grounds." Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182
(1969). See also Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. L.J.
1050 (1965); Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963).
The Supreme Court discovered its supervisory power in McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943), but lower federal courts have invoked the doctrine as well. See note 79
and accompanying text infra. Instead of analyzing the source of supervisory power, com-
mentators have concentrated on the policy considerations behind specific applications of
the Supreme Court's supervisory rulings. See, e.g., Note, Standards for the Suppression of Evi-
dence Under the Supreme Court's Supervisory Power, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 364 (1977); Comment,
Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary
Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129 (1973).
2 These aspects of supervisory power need not appear in the same case. Compare
United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976) (one-time sanction to enforce conform-
ity among federal attorneys), cert. dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 1873 (1978), with United States v.
Schiavo, 504 F.2d I (3d Cir.) (en banc) (rules regarding pre-trial publicity established), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) and United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D. C. Cir. 1971)
(ABA-approved jury instruction adopted).
3 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). Although not constitutionally
mandated, a supervisory ruling may be constitutionally inspired. Thus the supervisory
power
serves ends that are at 'least minimally posited by the Constitution, particularly the
Bill of Rights. But there is no resort to the Constitution as the source of the
governing standard, and the rigidities of constitutional decision, such as they are,
are therefore avoided; the results are not binding upon Congress or the states.
Hill, supra note 1, at 193. Professor Monaghan draws supervisory power within his broad
analytical framework---"constitutional common law." Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38-40 (1975).
[A] surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional "interpreta-
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must yield to congressional action. 4
Intermediate supervisory power-the supervisory power exer-
cised by federal courts of appeals-has touched all aspects of the
judicial process including courtroom activities at both trial and ap-
pellate stages and pre-trial activities such as the grand jury pro-
cess.5 When exercising supervisory power, however, courts of ap-
peals have shown little sensitivity to the balance of power between
the judiciary and its coordinate branches. They have moved be-
yond areas of special judicial competence seeking to control law
enforcement activities,6 and they have neglected one of the two
original purposes behind the Supreme Court's independent use of
supervisory power-implementation of congressional policy.7 All
the while, courts of appeals have simply assumed they have the
tion" is best understood as something of a quite different order-a substructure of
substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and author-
ity from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a con-
stitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by
Congress.
Id. at 2-3.
4 For example, Congress has modified the exclusionary rules of Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). See 18
U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1970); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-41, reprinted in [1968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2124-27. Congress also limited the discovery rule of
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970); S. REP. No. 981,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1861, 1862. See
also Hill, supra note 1, at 195.
Examples of "one-way" common law, supervisory decisions do not apply to state
courts through the fourteenth amendment. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
600-01 (1961); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 197 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342
U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943); Monaghan,
supra note 3, at 38-40. Supervisory rules are also unavailable to plaintiffs in federal habeas
corpus proceedings following state court convictions. See, e.g., Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 F.2d
128, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1964).
5 Intermediate supervisory power is independently exercised by courts of appeals. When
courts of appeals implement the Supreme Court's supervisory rulings, they exercise deriva-
tive supervisory power.
6 Invoking supervisory power, courts of appeals have developed exclusionary rules to
deal with what they characterize as overzealous law enforcement. See note 53 and accom-
panying text infra. Similarly, courts of appeals have threatened to control law enforcement
officers by relying on supervisory power to dismiss cases involving law enforcement
techniques that offend judicial sensibilities. See note 55 infra. United States v. Toscanino,
500 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974), suggested that supervisory power could justify a federal
court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant forcibly abducted from a foreign
country. See United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (concurring opinion, Oakes,
J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).7 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 34142 (1943); text accompanying notes
60-62 infra. The other original purpose was to establish fair and civilized standards of
procedure in the federal courts. See 318 U.S. at 340.
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right to invoke supervisory power.8 Although this assumption is
highly questionable, longstanding use of supervisory power virtu-
ally ensures its survival in the circuit courts. Judicial circumspection
inspired by an understanding of the doctrine's dubious origins re-
mains the only realistic safeguard against future abuse of inter-
mediate supervisory power.
I
INTERMEDIATE SUPERVISORY POWER IN PRACTICE
A. The Courtroom Process
Intermediate supervisory power has become a convenient tool
with which to control trial judge discretion, enabling appellate
courts to overturn lower court decisions in the absence of reversible
errors of law. 9 Eighty years ago, in Allen v. United States,' ° the Su-
preme Court affirmed the use of supplemental instructions to
deadlocked juries. The Court approved the trial judge's request
that jury members of the minority position reconsider their stand
in the interest of judicial efficiency. Since Allen, the circuits have
disagreed over the extent to which a trial judge may pressure a
juror to accept the majority position. 1 Seven circuits have de-
veloped strict limitations on use of the Allen charge. 12 Three cir-
cuits have gone further, exercising supervisory power to abolish
the Allen charge altogether.' 3 Citing interests of justice' 4 and the
8 See notes 79-83 and accompanying text infra. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
340 (1943), spoke of supervisory power only in terms of the "court of ultimate review."
9 See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). Dissenting in Thiel, Justice
Frankfurter would not have reversed a judgment "free from intrinsic infirmity." Id. at 234.
By promulgating supervisory rules, appellate courts can promote consistency among trial
courts.
10 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
11 United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 661-69 (5th Cir. 1972), discusses the history of
the Allen charge and the problems associated with its use.
12 See United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 517 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Scott, 547 F.2d 334, 336-37 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883
(1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1340-43 (4th Cir. 1970); Sullivan
v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 716-18 (9th Cir. 1969); Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d
543, 552-54 (8th Cir. 1969); Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431, 434 (10th Cir.
1966).
13 United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); United States v.
Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970). Thomas, 449 F.2d at
1187, and Brown, 411 F.2d at 933, prospectively adopted the procedures recommended by
the American Bar Association. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4
(Approved Draft 1968). Fioravanti adopted similar standards. 412 F.2d at 420 n.32. The
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"drain on appellate resources" caused by frequent allegations of
prejudice to defendants, 15 the latter three courts established pro-
spective standards for dealing with deadlocked juries. The exercise
of intermediate supervisory power thus eliminated a constitution-
ally permissible procedure.
Through use of intermediate supervisory power, courts of ap-
peals have developed criteria to guide trial judges faced with ques-
dons of law. They have established new standards to determine
whether a confession was voluntary and therefore admissible, 16 de-
veloped criteria for consideration of guilty pleas,17 and abandoned
Fifth Circuit still approves of the Allen charge, although it recognizes its supervisory power
to "abolish Allen, to limit it, or to replace it with the ABA standard." United States v.
Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 668 (5th Cir. 1972).
14 United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970).
'" United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1971).See also United States v.
Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 419-20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); United States
v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970).
Courts of appeals have exercised intermediate supervisory power to cure other prob-
lems relating to jury instructions. The Fifth Circuit, for example, retroactively proscribed a
jury instruction on proof of intent "couched in language which could reasonably be inter-
preted as shifting the burden to the accused to produce proof of innocence." United States
v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d 1244, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc). The Third Circuit prospec-
tively promulgated guidelines on jury instructions concerning the reliability of witnesses'
identifications. United States v.. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 526-28 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 958 (1971). In Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971), the same court prospectively required trial judges in personal
injury actions to instruct jurors that awards are not subject to federal income taxation. Id.
at 1251. The Third Circuit explained its rationale for promulgating a prospective supervi-
sory rule:
[W]e recognize that our approach to this problem represents a new view in this
judicial circuit as well as in other Circuits. Indeed, the position we adopt has been
accepted by only a handful of state jurisdictions. In this situation, it cannot be said
that the trial court erred in refusing the instruction at the time it was proffered.
Paying even the most scrupulous attention to the sometimes subtle shifting of ap-
pellate winds, the district court could not have been expected to forecast the deci-
sion we reach here.
Id. at 1252 (footnote omitted).
16 See Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (rehearing en banc); United
States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1965).
The Supreme Court in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), ruled four-to-three that
the voluntariness of a confession should be judged by a preponderance-of-the-evidence test
rather than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard adopted in Pea and Inman. The Fifth
Circuit maintains that Lego foreclosed courts of appeals from adopting the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard through intermediate supervisory power. United States v. Wat-
son, 469 F.2d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1972). The two circuits that decided Pea and Inman have
since read Lego to require a uniform national rule. See United States v. Wiggins, 509 F.2d
454 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Johnson, 495 F2d 378 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 860 (1974).
17 See Moody v. United States, 497 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1974) (trial court required to
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the M'Naughten Rule in favor of the Model Penal Code determina-
tion of insanity.18 Although the Sixth Circuit, in United States v.
Florea,'9 held that innocent contact between a prosecution witness
and the jury in deliberation did not constitute reversible error,2 0
the court did exercise supervisory power prospectively to promul-
gate a per se rule prohibiting jury contact with interested parties.2 '
Appellate courts have also altered sentences, 22 established pro-
determine if plea bargain precipitated guilty plea). In Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d
1182 (9th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 483 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1973), two judges initially read
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 to require judges to find factual bases for guilty pleas at the time of
the pleas rather than at the time of judgment. 483 F.2d at 1185-86. Invoking intermediate
supervisory power, the Ninth Circuit remanded with instructions that the defendant be al-
lowed to plead again rather than with directions to determine if a factual basis did exist at the
time of the original pleading. Id. at 1187-88. In support of this exercise of intermediate
supervisory power, Judge Ely engaged in an exhaustive analysis of the doctrine's applica-
tions in the federal courts of appeals. Id. Many courts of appeals still rely on this delinea-
tion for justification of intermediate supervisory power. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs,
547 F.2d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 1873 (1978). Dissenting, Judge
Byrne seriously questioned the existence of intermediate supervisory power. 483 F.2d at
1189-90 (9th Cir. 1973). See note 80 infra. On rehearing, the court concluded that Rule 11
had been misconstrued. 483 F.2d at 1190-91. The final majority adopted Judge Byrne's
position with the exception of his discussion of intermediate supervisory power. Id. Judge
Ely's discussion of intermediate supervisory power became dictum. Thus, a foundation case
often cited as support for intermediate supervisory power involved no exercise of the
power at all.
18 See Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Free-
man, 357 F.2d 606, 623-25 (2d Cir. 1966). For another example of the use of intermediate
supervisory power to alter evidentiary standards, see Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365
(5th Cir. 1969) (use of F.E.L.A. evidentiary standards limited to F.E.L.A. issues only).
'9 541 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977).
20 An FBI agent who had previously testified for the prosecution was present when
an evidentiary tape was played for the jury during their deliberations. Id. at 570.
21 Although we do not hold the contact with the jury in this case violated due
process as it did in Turner [379 U.S. 466 (1965)], we nonetheless do not-and in
the future we will not-condone similar acts. We are required to exercise supervi-
sory authority over the administration ofjustice in courts of this circuit even in cases
where departures from ideal procedures fall short of a violation of due process.
... We determine that a per se rule is necessary here because although the danger
of improper influence inheres in every contact between an interested party and a
jury, actual prejudice may be difficult to establish.
541 F.2d at 572. The per se rule called for reversal upon proof of any unauthorized contact
between jurors and interested parties. Id.
In Virgin Islands v. Bodle, 427 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1970), the Third Circuit exercised
supervisory power to grant a new trial after the defendant had been convicted for rape.
There was a substantial possibility that one juror had not made an objective determination
of the facts because his sister had also been raped. Id. at 534.
22 See Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966) (defendant who received
increased sentence due to refusal to waive fifth amendment rights had sentence vacated
and case remanded for resentencing). See also United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285,
1292 (5th Cir. 1978) (deadlines for motions to reduce sentences); United States v. Pinkney,
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cedural standards for criminal contempt proceedings, 23 and re-
structured informa pauperis appeals. 24
Courts of appeals have even exercised supervisory power to
reach prosecutorial behavior. 5 When prosecutors failed to reveal
an FBI report containing information favorable to the defendant,
the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Poole,26 reversed the convic-
tion by invoking intermediate supervisory power.27 Similarly, the
551 F.2d 1241, 1249-51 (D. C. Cir. 1976) (standards for effective representation at sentenc-
ing).
Although the Supreme Court has used supervisory power to control sentencing (Yates
v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1958)) courts of appeals have been hesitant to
exercise their power in this area. See United States v. Holder, 412 F.2d 212, 214-15 (2d
Cir. 1969); Russell v. United States, 288 F.2d 520, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 926 (1962).
23 See United States v. CBS, 497 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1974).
24 See Tate v. United States, 359 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (retroactive rule); Wilde-
blood v. United States, 273 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
2'A striking example of supervisory control of prosecutorial behavior is United States
v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389 (D.S.D. 1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. Means,
513 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1975). Banks involved the exercise of independent supervisory
power by a district court rather than an exercise of intermediate supervisory power. During
the trial, prosecutors elicited false testimony and obfuscated other testimonial inconsist-
encies. The trial concluded with no verdict because a juror had become ill and the gov-
ernment would not acquiesce to a decision by 11 jurors. Judge Nichol dismissed the charges
on the basis of supervisory power:
Although it hurts me deeply, I am forced to the conclusion that the prosecu-
tion in this trial had something other than attaining justice foremost in its mind.
In deciding this motion I have taken into consideration the prosecution's conduct
throughout the entire trial. The fact that incidents of misconduct formed a pat-
tern throughout the course of the trial leads me to the belief that this case was not
prosecuted in good faith or in the spirit of justice. The waters of justice have been
polluted, and dismissal, I believe, is the appropriate cure for the pollution in this
case.
383 F. Supp. at 397. The government appealed in United States v. Means, 513 F.2d 1329
(8th Cir. 1975), but the court of appeals held that double jeopardy barred further prosecu-
tion. Id. at 1332-36.
26 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967).
27 The Seventh Circuit recognized separation-of-powers problems but exercised inter-
mediate supervisory power after finding other overriding considerations:
Balancing the factors of the availability of the evidence and conduct of gov-
ernment counsel against the probability of prejudice, we think the failure to dis-
close the report denied Poole a fundamentally fair trial. The interest of the gov-
ernment in the integrity of the criminal process weighs heavily in the balance
against its interest in avoiding a retrial in this case. It had no interest, security or
otherwise, in not disclosing the report.... We are aware that the exercise of our
supervisory power here has a substantial, although indirect, effect on the executive
branch of government. But we are impelled to use it to protect the integrity of the
criminal fact-finding process.
Id. at 649 (footnote omitted). Judge Knoch dissented: "If we are not prepared to say that
the government counsel's conduct (in failing voluntarily to disclose the correct name of the
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Ninth Circuit, in Guam v. Camacho,28 refused to permit the gov-
ernment to withdraw a concession to the defendant.
29
B. Beyond the Courtroom
In the pre-trial stage,30 courts of appeals have relied on super-
visory power in reviewing activities ranging from the first contact
between the government and the accused to grand jury proceed-
ings.3 1 In United States v. Jacobs,3 2 the Second Circuit confronted
the failure of a Strike Force attorney to warn a witness before the
grand jury that she was also a target of investigation. 3 The dis-
examining physician) violated the standards of due process, then I think we should not
reach the same practical result through the exercise of our supervisory power." Id.
28 470 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1972).
29 Defendant had been convicted of first and second degree burglary. However, on
appeal the government conceded reversal on the charge of first degree burglary because
the evidence was insufficient. Before oral argument, the government informally attempted
to reverse its position. Id. at 920. The court directed a judgment of dismissal on the first
degree burglary count through an exercise of supervisory power. Id.
30 Although intermediate supervisory power at the pre-trial stage focuses primarily on
agents of the executive branch (government attorneys and law enforcement officers), it has
also controlled judicial conduct. In United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d I (3d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), for example, the Third Circuit promulgated a supervi-
sory rule for pre-trial publicity. Judge Aldisert criticized the decision:
Under the aegis of the exercise of the court's supervisory power the plurality
retroactively enunciates a new rule of procedure requiring that a silence order
vindicating a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, if it refers to non-
parties, must (a) be reduced to writing, (b) state specifically the terms of the order
and the reasons therefor, and (c) be entered on the district court docket.
But this court has no power to prescribe procedural rules for the governance
of the district courts. That power is vested, by statute, in the Supreme Court. 18
U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075. At the very most, the suggestions
of the plurality should have been directed to the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 331,
instead of incorporating them by judicial fiat in an in [sic] banc opinion.
Id. at 17 (dissenting opinion, Aldisert, J.).
31 The willingness of courts of appeals to exercise supervisory power over the grand
jury process varies among the circuits. Compare, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Hergenroeder), 555 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1977) (government not required to show relevance
of handwriting sample due to narrow construction of supervisory power over grand juries),
with In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973) (court will
not issue subpoena for handwriting samples, fingerprints, or mugshots until government
makes showing of relevance).
32 531 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded mem., 429 U.S. 909 (1976).
33 d. at 88-89. A Strike Force attorney based in Washington, D.C., had informally
advised defendant Jacobs of her constitutional rights, but had not told her that she was
under investigation. Jacobs was subsequently indicted for perjury because her testimony
before the grand jury contradicted an incriminating recorded conversation in the govern-
ment's possession. InJacobs, only the perjury charge, not the substantive count, was under
attack. Id.
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trict court concluded that such warnings were of constitutional
dimension, 4 relying on the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States
v. Mandujano.35 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed but re-
fused to reach the constitutional issue.36 Judge Gurfein deter-
mined that United States Attorneys within the circuit regularly
inform putative defendants that they are subjects of investiga-
tion.3 7 Exercising supervisory power to suppress the defendant's
grand jury testimony and dismiss the indictment, the Second Cir-
cuit instructed Strike Force attorneys to conform to established
standards of practice. 8
Soon after the Second Circuit decided Jacobs, the Supreme
Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's holding in Mandujano,3 9 con-
cluding that putative defendants in grand jury proceedings do not
have a constitutional right to full Miranda warnings.40 Shortly after
this decision, the Supreme Court summarily remanded Jacobs for
reconsideration in light of Mandujano.4' On remand, the Second
"' See 531 F.2d at 89.
35 496 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
36 531 F.2d at 89-91. The Second Circuit thus protected earlier decisions holding that,
after proper warnings, a putative defendant's testimony before a grand jury could be the
basis of a perjury indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 664-66 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975).
37 531 F.2d at 90. The court clerk had conducted a survey of the practices of United
States Attorneys in each district of the circuit. Id.
38 Id. Judge Gurfein found that the United States Attorneys followed ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3.6(d) (Approved Draft 1971): "'If the prosecutor believes that a witness is a potential
defendant he should not seek to compel his testimony before the grand jury without in-
forming him that he may be charged and that he should seek independent legal advice
concerning his rights.'" 531 F.2d at 90.
" United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
4 0 1d. at 580-84. The Supreme Court in Mandujano held that a witness could be in-
dicted for perjury on the basis of inconsistent grand jury testimony even though he had
not received Miranda warnings or notice that he was a target of investigation. More re-
cently, in United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977), the Court held that a sub-
sequent substantive indictment could stand against a grand jury witness who had testified
without first receiving target warnings. Id. at 186-91.
41 United States v. Jacobs, 429 U.S. 909 (1976) (mem.). In separate opinions, four Jus-
tices argued that the Second Circuit could expand defendants' rights beyond the narrowly
drawn constitutional limits of Mandujano through use of intermediate supervisory power.
Justice Stevens, concurring, stated: "I agree completely that a constitutional holding is
not controlling on a question involving nothing more than an exercise of an appellate
court's supervisory power." Id. He supported the remand to permit the Second Circuit to
address directly whether failure to warn putative defendants inexorably precludes a perjury
indictment. Id.
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart joined, dissented:
There is no reason to expect the Court of Appeals to reach a different result
in light of our decision in United States v. Mandujano . . . . Our holding that
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Circuit reaffirmed its earlier holding on the basis of intermediate
supervisory power, assuming its authority to control the actions of
federal attorneys involved in the grand jury process.4 2 Although
the Second Circuit did not promulgate a continuing requirement
dealing with warnings to putative defendants testifying before
grand juries, the court imposed a "one-time sanction to encourage
uniformity of practice" 43 between Strike Force and United States
Attorneys. 4
4
An earlier Second Circuit opinion foreshadowed Jacobs. In
United States v. Estepa,45 the court confronted the introduction of
hearsay evidence before grand juries46 by United States Attorneys
in violation of provisos developed in earlier cases.47 Chief Judge
respondent would not have had a constitutional right to have her testimony sup-
pressed simply has no bearing on a lower court decision which did not assume the
existence of such a constitutional right. And it is clear that the well-established
supervisory power of the courts of appeals over the district courts in their respec-
tive jurisdictions is not limited to enforcing constitutional rights.
Id. at 910-11.
In a separate opinion, Justice Stewart took the Court to task for issuing such an order:
"[T]his order of the Court is little short of irrational. While our heavy caseload necessarily
leads us sometimes to dispose of cases summarily, it must never lead us to dispose of any
case irresponsibly. Yet I fear precisely that has happened here." Id. at 910 (dissenting
opinion).
42 United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 98 S. Ct.
1873 (1978).43 Id. at 773.
44 Two courts have refused to follow Jacobs. United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049
(3d Cir. 1977), did not invoke supervisory power to promote consistency within the Third
Circuit because the government attorneys followed no uniform practice. Crocker, however,
did not foreclose the possibility of exercising supervisory power to implement the A.B.A.
standards followed in the Second Circuit. Id. at 1056. United States v. Hilliard, 436 F.
Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), found Jacobs inapposite because in December 1976 the Strike
Force had merged into the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York. Id. at 70.
45 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972).
46 The law enforcement officers most intimately connected .with the narcotics arrest of
defendants did not testify before the grand jury. Rather, the prosecution called one officer
remotely connected to the arrest to present detailed evidence. The grand jury was unaware
of the limited knowledge of the witness. Id. at 1134-35.
47 The Second Circuit's hearsay provisos require prosecutors (1) not to mislead grand
juries as to the quality of the evidence; (2) not to use hearsay evidence if a high probability
exists that the grand jury would not indict if it heard direct testimony; and (3) to use
hearsay evidence only when direct evidence is unavailable. See United States v. Leibowitz,
420 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Arcuri, 405 F.2d 691, 692-93 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 913 (1969); United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725, 730-31 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 80 (1967). See also 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1239 (1974).
These Second Circuit provisos extended the constitutional minima established in Lawn v.
United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958), and Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956),
which upheld indictments based on hearsay evidence.
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Friendly attacked the laxity of the United States Attorneys and
argued that an admonition would not serve the purposes of the
court because such warnings had been ignored in the past.48 In-
voking intermediate supervisory power, he reversed the conviction
with orders to dismiss the indictment in the hope that a one-time
sanction would bring about future adherence to established stan-
dards.49
InJacobs and Estepa, the Second Circuit exercised intermediate
supervisory power to force federal attorneys within the circuit to
comply uniformly with established rules. But courts of appeals
have also promulgated new standards significantly altering the
grand jury process. 50 The Third Circuit, for example, ordered the
government to make preliminary showings of relevance, jurisdic-
tion, and purpose before courts would issue subpoenas to obtain
handwriting samples, fingerprints, and mug shots. 51
48 471 F.2d at 1135-37.
49 Here the Assistant United States Attorney, whether wittingly or unwittingly-we
prefer to think the latter, clearly [did not inform the grand jury of the weakness
of hearsay evidence and the fact that better evidence was available]. We cannot,
with proper respect for the discharge of our duties, content ourselves with yet
another admonition; a reversal with instructions to dismiss the indictment may
help to translate the assurances of the United States Attorneys into consistent per-
formance by their assistants.
Id. at 1137. Since Estepa, two district courts have similarly dismissed indictments to enforce
the Second Circuit hearsay provisos. See United States v. Pastor, 419 F. Supp. 1318, 1323-
24 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 314-15 (D. Conn. 1975).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1010 (2d Cir.) (same grand jury
that heard immunized testimony cannot indict witness after he testifies), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 980 (1976), 429 U.S. 1066, 430 U.S. 982 (1977) (separate petitions). See also United
States v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir.) (retroactive application of Hinton rule), aff'd
on rehearing, 560 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1977).
51 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Schofield I]. Schofield I retroactively established that the government must "make
some preliminary showing by affidavit that each item is at least relevant to an investigation
being conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is not sought
primarily for another purpose." Id. The Third Circuit recognized that these standards ex-
tended the constitutional minima set forth in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973),
and United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973). 486 F.2d at 89. The case reached the Third
Circuit again two years later. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 507 F.2d 963 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Schofield II]. Schofield II held
that the government had complied with the criteria announced in Schofield I and affirmed
the conviction of the defendant. The court justified the criteria as a proper exercise of its
supervisory power over grand juries:
Our supervisory power over grand juries is derived from several sources. Under
18 U.S.C. § 3331 and F.R.Cr.P. 6(a) a district court is given power to call a grand
jury into existence; under F.R.Cr.P. 17(a), and 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) respectively,
the district court is given the power to issue and the duty to enforce grand jury
subpoenas.
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If courts refrain from exercising supervisory power over
grand juries for fear of infringing upon executive prerogatives, 52
they should not reach activities earlier in the law enforcement pro-
cess where claims of judicial competence are even more tenuous.
Courts of appeals have controlled activities of government agents
in the field through supervisory suppression-the refusal to per-
mit introduction of tainted evidence in judicial proceedings. 53 In
Id. at 964 n.2. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hergenroeder), 555 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.
1977) (refused to adopt Schofield I procedures due to narrow construction of supervisory
power over grand juries).
52 The grand jury contrary to what seems to be the prevailing general belief is
an integral part of the judicial arm of the government and is not a mere tool of
the prosecutor. The United States Attorney, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and other branches of the Department of Justice are integral parts of the execu-
tive branch of the government. The grand jury, being part and parcel of the
judicial branch of government, is subject to a supervisory power in the courts,
aimed at preventing abuses of its process or authority. However, inasmuch as the
United States Attorney's Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are not
part of the judicial branch of the government they are not in the performance of
their executive functions, by reason of our constitutional separation of powers sys-
tem, subject to the supervisory power of the courts.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Central States, 225 F. Supp. 923, 925 (N.D. Ill. 1964). But see
United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 793 (9th Cir. 1974) (concurring opinion, Huf-
stedler, J.) (federal prosecutors at grand jury stage subject to court's supervisory power).
The history of the grand jury does not dispel the confusion surrounding the scope of
supervisory power. The grand jury process exhibits characteristics of both the executive
and judicial branches. In England, the grand jury originally served an investigatory func-
tion and was intimately connected with the Crown. In time, the grand jury began to serve
as a buffer between the Crown and the citizenry, maintaining its investigatory function as
well. The protective role of the grand jury has been emphasized by the Supreme Court. See
Branzberg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390
(1962). But see Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) ("grand inquest"). When the
grand jury serves as a buffer between the citizenry and the State it implicates purely judi-
cial concerns; executive interests predominate when the grand jury serves as an investiga-
tive body. The problem is that the grand jury serves both functions simultaneously. For
further information on the development of the dual role of the grand jury, see generally I
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION
34-37 (1931); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 137-40 (1947);
Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases: A Preliminary
Analysis, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME-ANNOTATIONS AND CONSULTANT'S PAPERS
80, 83 app. C (1967); Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L. REV. 590
(1961).
53 The exercise of supervisory suppression is a power so intimately linked with Su-
preme Court rulings as to approach the line dividing intermediate supervisory power from
derivative supervisory power. See note 5 supra. See also Note, supra note 1, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 364.
Courts of appeals have exercised supervisory suppression. See, e.g., United States v.
Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351, 1354-58 (7th Cir. 1969) (exclusionary rule extended to defend-
ants who faced line-up without counsel), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); Ricks v.
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most cases, however, courts have declined to exercise interme-
diate supervisory power over activities of government agents that
are not in themselves illegal.54 Such judicial restraint is discre-
tionary.55
II
SUPERVISORY POWER IN THEORY
Intermediate supervisory power must be analyzed in light of
the development of the supervisory power of the Supreme Court.
The Court discovered its supervisory power over inferior federal
courts thirty-five years ago in McNabb v. United States.5 6 When
viewed as the product of earlier decisions rather than the embodi-
ment of intrinsic principles, 57 McNabb reveals much about the na-
United States, 334 F.2d 964, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But they have been hesitant to do so.
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 433 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (supervisory
grounds rejected for suppression of evidence obtained by telephone monitor installed with
third-party consent), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971); Butterwood v. United States, 365
F.2d 380, 384-85 (10th Cir. 1966) (arrest by state police followed by FBI interrogation
survives McNabb-Mallory rule).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213, 229-30 (4th Cir.) (refusal to suppress
evidence derived from consensual electronic surveillance as "dirty business"), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 823 (1973); Henry v. United States, 432 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1970), modified, 434
F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.) (refusal to exercise supervisory power to require presence of counsel
when pubic hair removed from defendant for evidence), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1011 (1971);
Whitted v. United States, 411 F.2d 107, 108-09 (9th Cir. 1969) (defendant convicted of sale
of narcotics even though six months passed between sale to agent and defendant's arrest),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Ford v. United States, 352 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (en
banc) (rejecting rule requiring arrest warrant whenever obtainable); United States v. D'An-
giolillo, 340 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir.) (unlawful search by government agents that produced
evidence not used at trial did not warrant supervisory power dismissal), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 955 (1965); United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1958) (exercise of super-
visory power not warranted when prosecuting attorneys requested I.R.S. agent to inspect
tax returns of veniremen).
55 In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), five Justices recognized that
supervisory power could protect defendants from outrageous conduct by law enforcement
officers even when a traditional entrapment defense is unavailable. See id. at 495 (concur-
ring opinion, Powell, J.); id. at 497 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.). Two circuits have
since recognized the supervisory power defense. See United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319,
1324-25 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1485 (1978); United States v. Reifsteck, 535
F.2d 1030, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 1976).
Courts of appeals have not agreed over the use of supervisory power to reverse convic-
tions resulting from testimony of government informers paid on contingent fee bases.
Compare United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 394-96 (6th Cir.) (conviction affirmed), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971), with Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 444-45 (5th
Cir. 1962) (conviction reversed).
56 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
57 This mode of analysis is rejected in Note, supra note 1, 76 HARV. L. REv. at 1662-63,
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ture and scope of supervisory power.
McNabb involved the conviction of defendants for murder on
the basis of statements procured after their arrest but before they
were brought before a magistrate. 58 The Supreme Court reversed
the convictions by invoking supervisory power. Subsequent de-
velopment of the doctrine has turned on one paragraph of Jus-
tice Frankfurter's opinion:
[T]he scope of our reviewing power over convictions brought
here from the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment of
Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the administration
of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of estab-
lishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and
evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance
of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason
which are summarized as "due process of law" and below which
we reach what is really trial by force.59
Read in isolation, this discussion imposes no limits on super-
visory power. The Court in McNabb, however, did circumscribe the
doctrine by relying on federal statutes for the basic policy under-
pinnings of its decision:
and is not followed in Note, supra note 1, 53 GEo. L.J. 1050. These discussions concentrate
on the principles of judicial integrity and inherent power which, although crucial to under-
standing supervisory power, distort its meaning when viewed in light of McNabb and its
progeny.
58 318 U.S. at 334-38. Federal officers held two of the McNabb brothers incom-
municado in a detention cell for 14 hours and intensively questioned them over the next
two days. Id. at 334-37. Upon his surrender, a third McNabb also underwent intensive
interrogation. Id. at 337. The federal officers had not brought the defendants before a
magistrate before questioning.
59 318 U.S. at 340. Courts of appeals cite this paragraph as the primary justification of
intermediate supervisory power and generally do not engage in independent analysis. See,
e.g., United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351, 1355 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1017 (1970).
Immediately before this paragraph, Justice Frankfurter outlined the application of due
process principles to roughly similar situations. He stressed the effect of due process hold-
ings by citing cases in which the Supreme Court had imposed procedures upon the states.
Only after that discussion did the Court refuse to reach the constitutional issue presented.
318 U.S. at 340. Instead of relying on the due process clause, the Court exercised super-
visory power, thus enabling the states to develop their own fair procedures:
[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will best
further its own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appro-
priate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its
jurisdiction. Considerations of large policy in making the necessary accommoda-
tions in our federal system are wholly irrelevant to the formulation and applica-
tion of proper standards for the enforcement of the federal criminal law in the
federal courts.
Id. at 340-41.
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In holding that the petitioners' admissions were improperly
received in evidence against them, and that having been based on
this evidence their convictions cannot stand, we confine ourselves to
our limited function as the court of ultimate review of the standards
formulated and applied by federal courts in the trial of criminal cases.
We are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in
so far as courts themselves become instruments of law enforce-
ment. We hold only that a decent regard for the duty of courts as
agencies of justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men
should be convicted upon evidence secured under the cir-
cumstances revealed here. In so doing, we respect the policy which
underlies Congressional legislation. The history of liberty has largely been
the history of observance of procedural safeguards. And the effective
administration of criminal justice hardly requires disregard offair proce-
dures imposed by law.60
Because the arresting officers had acted in a manner Congress had
"explicitly denied them,"' 61 the Court implemented congressional
policy by developing an exclusionary rule.62
McNabb was not the first instance in which the Court im-
plemented legislative policy by creating an exclusionary mechanism
not specifically required by statute. Nardone v. United States63 set
forth a rule suppressing evidence that federal law enforcement of-
6 0 Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 342. Congress had promulgated several procedural laws emphasizing the need
to bring the accused before a magistrate quickly. Act of August 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat.
372, 416 (1894) (marshal, deputy, or other officer must take accused before nearest United
States Commissioner or judicial officer with jurisdiction) (superseded by FED. R. CRIM. P.
5(a)); Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 595, 48 Stat. 1008 (1934) (officer of FBI must take accused
immediately before committing officer) (superseded by FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)); Act of
March 1, 1879, ch. 125, § 9, 20 Stat. 327 (1879) (persons arrested for operating illegal
distillery to be taken forthwith before magistrate) (superseded by FED. R. GRIM. P. 5(a)).
The modern counterpart of these early enactments, FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a), fully captures
their flavor:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any
person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the event
that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judicial
officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041.
62 Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disre-
gard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand
without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law.
Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured. But to
permit such evidence to be made the basis of a conviction in the federal courts
would stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into law.
318 U.S. at 345.
63 308 U.S. 338 (1939) [hereinafter referred to as Nardone].
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ficers had obtained as the "fruit" of illegal wiretaps. 64 Justice
Frankfurter stated:
Any claim for the exclusion of evidence logically relevant in
criminal prosecutions is heavily handicapped. It must be justified
by an over-riding public policy expressed in the Constitution or
the law of the land. In a .problem such as that before us now, two
opposing concerns must be harmonized: on the one hand, the
stern enforcement of the criminal law; on the other, protection
of that realm of privacy left free by Constitution and laws but
capable of infringement either through zeal or design. In ac-
commodating both these concerns, meaning must be given to
what Congress has written, even if not in explicit language, so as
to effectuate the policy which Congress has formulated. 65
The legislation construed in Nardone was a response to an ear-
lier Supreme Court decision, Olmstead v. United States,66 which
refused to extend an exclusionary rule without congressional au-
thority to victims of illegal government wiretapping because wire-
tapping, albeit illegal, did not violate defendant's fourth amend-
64 1d. at 341. Defendants were originally convicted on the basis of evidence obtained
through illegal wiretaps. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 380 (1937) [hereinafter
referred to as Nardone I]. The Court construed the Federal Communications Act of 1934,
ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)):
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or assisting in
transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall di-
vulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or reception, to any
person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, . . . or in response to a
subpena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other lawful
authority.
The Court held: "To recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court is
to divulge the message." 302 U.S. at 382.
On remand, the Second Circuit tentatively held that the exclusionary rule fashioned by
the Court did not reach the fruits of the wiretap. United States v. Nardone, 106 F.2d 41,
44 (2d Cir. 1939). On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice Frank-
furter: "Such a reading of § 605 would largely stultify the policy which compelled our de-
cision in [Nardone 1]." 308 U.S. at 340. Justice Frankfurter misread Nardone I, a decision
based on tight statutory construction and only tangentially on policy considerations. See
302 U.S. at 384. According to Justice Frankfurter, the earlier decision "was not the prod-
uct of a merely meticulous reading of technical language. It was the translation into prac-
ticality of broad considerations of morality and public well-being." 308 U.S. at 340. To
further congressional policy, Justice Frankfurter established procedures for hearings that
placed the burden on defendants to show that wiretaps were illegal and that a substantial
portion of the prosecutor's evidence was the "fruit of the poisonous tree." 308 U.S. at 341.
65 308 U.S. at 340.
66 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
1978] INTERMEDIATE SUPERVISORY POWER
ment rights. 67 Dissenting in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis68 and Justice
Holmes69 argued that the integrity of the judicial system must not
be compromised by convictions based on tainted evidence; the
courts should not condone illegal acts by upholding convictions of
victimized defendants.7 0
McNabb combined Nardone's implementation of congressional
policy with the protection of judicial integrity called for in the
Olmstead dissents.7 1 In fact, the Court did not have to look beyond
the decisions of the previous fifteen years to "discover" supervisory
power. Moreover, McNabb implicitly circumscribed the policy initia-
tive of the Court by recognizing that Congress indirectly controlled
the Court's exercise of supervisory power.
67 Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone messages by mak-
ing them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by
direct legislation, and thus depart from the common law of evidence. But the
courts may not adopt such a policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual mean-
ing to the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 465-66.
" Id. at 471.69 Id. at 469.
70 Both Justices discussed the constitutional issues. Justice Holmes stated:
While I do not deny it, I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant, although I fully agree that Courts
are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law where those words
import a policy that goes beyond them.
Id. at 469. Justice Brandeis argued that the policy if not the literal meaning of the fourth
and fifth amendments protects the defendant. Id. at 471-79. Justice Brandeis then applied
the principles of equity to the criminal law and developed a doctrine ofjudicial integrity:
Will this Court by sustaining the judgment below sanction such conduct on
the part of the Executive? The governing principle has long been settled. It is that
a court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands.
... Where the Government is the actor, the reasons for applying it are even more
persuasive. Where the remedies invoked are those of the criminal law, the reasons
are compelling.
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to de-
clare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of
a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doc-
trine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 483-85 (footnotes omitted).
71 McNabb explicitly relies upon Nardone (318 U.S. at 341) but does not cite Olmstead.
The spirit of Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent, however, is pervasive. See id. at 343-44.
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The McNabb model, however, quickly disintegrated. Acting in
areas of traditional judicial concern, the Court removed congres-
sional input from the model.7 2 As the Court began to follow its own
policy preferences, the protection of the integrity of the judicial
72 Although it is beyond the purview of this Note to analyze the development of
supervisory power on the Supreme Court level, it may be useful to summarize critical cases
in which the Court sub silentio repudiated the restrictions recognized in McNabb.
In Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), the Court ended the practice of
exempting working men from jury duty because they could not afford to serve:
It follows that we cannot sanction the method by which the jury panel was
formed in this case. The trial court should have granted petitioner's motion to
strike the panel. That conclusion requires us to reverse the judgment below in the
exercise of our power of supervision over the administration of justice in the fed-
eral courts. . . . On that basis it becomes unnecessary to determine whether the
petitioner was in any way prejudiced by the wrongful exclusion or whether he was
one of the excluded class .... It is likewise immaterial that the jury which actually
decided the factual issue in the case was found to contain at least five members of
the laboring class. The evil lies in the admitted wholesale exclusion of a large class
of wage earners in disregard of the high standards of jury selection. To reassert
those standards, to guard against the subtle undermining of the jury system, re-
quires a new trial by a jury drawn from a panel properly and fairly chosen.
Id. at 225. Importantly, Thiel extended supervisory power to civil cases. Justice Frankfurter,
joined by Justice Reed, dissented:
If it be suggested that until there is legislation this decision will be the means of
encouraging the district judges to uncover a better answer than they have thus far
given to a lively problem, an appropriate admonition from the Court would ac-
complish the same result, or common action regarding the practice now under
review may be secured from the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. To reverse
a judgment free from intrinsic infirmity and perhaps to put in question other
judgments based on verdicts that resulted from the same method of selecting
juries, reminds too much of burning the barn in order to roast the pig.
Id. at 233-34.
Reviewing the New York Blue Ribbon Jury in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947),
the Court stated: "Over federal proceedings we may exert a supervisory power with great-
er freedom to reflect our notions of good policy than we may constitutionally exert over
proceedings in state courts, and these expressions of policy are not necessarily embodied in
the concept of due process." Id. at 287.
In Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956), the Court moved beyond traditional
judicial concerns and ruled on the credibility of a paid government informer who testified
falsely before a Senate committee after testifying in a Smith Act case:
This is a federal criminal case, and this Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the
proceedings of the federal courts. If it has any duty to perform in this regard, it is
to see that the waters of justice are not polluted. Pollution having taken place
here, the condition should be remedied at the earliest opportunity.
Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).
When exercising supervisory power over the activities of law enforcement officers, the
Court has respected the McNabb model. See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S 214, 216-18
(1956). See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963); On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747, 754-55 (1952).
The growth of supervisory power cannot be attributed to a natural growth of the law.
By departing so drastically from the McNabb model, supervisory power has become a rud-
derless source of law. See notes 74-78 and accompanying text infra.
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system became the sole rationale for the exercise of supervisory
power. Supervisory power emerged as a nonstatutory rulemaking
power motivated solely by the Court's conceptions of procedural
fairness. As a convenient tool for extending judicial power, the
doctrine permitted decisions on the merits that would have been
impossible under traditional analyses of error and prejudice.73
III
THE FABRICATED DOCTRINE OF INTERMEDIATE
SUPERVISORY POWER
No justification exists for the unlimited exercise of supervisory
power. Unrestrained by the requirement to implement congres-
sional policy, supervisory policy-making can no longer look to
McNabb for its source. But the search for alternative foundations
produces no satisfactory result. Supervisory power does not arise
solely from the inherent power of courts74 because supervisory
power can affect activities that lie beyond traditional judicial con-
cerns. It may be distinguished from the long-standing power of
courts to fashion evidentiary rules7 5 because supervisory decisions
73 See note 72 supra.
74 One court has defined inherent power as "that which is essential to the existence,
dignity and functions of the court from the very fact that it is a court." In re Integration of
Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 288, 275 N.W. 265, 267 (1937). See also Note,
supra note 1, 53 GEO. L.J. at 1052 (quoting Dowling, Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21
A.B.A.J. 635, 635 (1935)). Of particular interest is the inherent procedural rulemaking
power of courts. See Pound, The Rule-Making Power of Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926);
Note, supra note 1, 53 GEO. L.J. at 1052-53. Traditionally, rulemaking through inherent
power was limited to technical procedural matters. See Pound, Procedure Under Rules of
Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REv. 28, 35-36 n.18 (1952). It is doubtful that English
courts possessed inherent powers of a scope equal to supervisory power. See Note, supra
note 1, 53 GEO. L.J. at 1054-55. Professor Hill states: "We do not think of our own judges
as heirs to the English practice, such as it was, of constraining the executive branch by
rules developed from common law sources, subject to the ultimate authority of the legisla-
ture." Hill, supra note I, at 208. See also Monaghan, supra note 3, at 34-35.
Discussions of the inherent powers of courts, and particularly of inherent rulemaking
powers, may center on English and state courts because judicial rulemaking in the federal
system derives from congressional legislation empowering federal courts to establish "all
necessary rules for the orderly conducting [of] business." The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). Cf. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76
COLUm. L. REv. 905, 916-17 (1976) (Judiciary Act of 1789 underlines inherent procedural
and rulemaking powers of federal courts).
7- In McNabb, Justice Frankfurter tried to rest the decision on evidentiary grounds:
The principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal
trials have not been restricted, therefore, to those derived solely from the Con-
stitution. In the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts, see Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
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do not depend on the nature of the evidence7 6 and often involve
no evidentiary rulings at all. And although courts and commen-
tators urge that the need to promote fairness in the administration
of justice suffices to justify supervisory power,7 7 this justification
alone was inadequate in McNabb.7 8 Certainly, applications of super-
visory power that range beyond the narrow confines of special
judicial competence cannot avoid criticism based on the separation
of powers simply because courts invoke the need to protectjudicial
integrity.
Intermediate supervisory power magnifies the insubstantiality
of the supervisory power doctrine. Courts of appeals never pause
to question whether the Supreme Court intended them to exercise
supervisory power at all.7 9 Few courts seriously investigate the
341-42, this Court has, from the very beginning of its history, formulated rules of
evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions. . . . And in formulating
such rules of evidence for federal criminal trials the Court has been guided by
considerations of justice not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance.
318 U.S. at 341 (footnote omitted). But supervisory decisions encompass much more than
evidentiary rules. See notes 56-73 and accompanying text supra.
7 Supervisory evidentiary rulings often involve supervisory suppression. These rulings
look to the activities that produced the evidence and seek to deter such conduct. See gener-
ally Note, supra note 1, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 364.
77 Some analysts have accepted protection of the integrity of the judicial system as an
adequate justification. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1147; Note, supra note 1, 76 HARV. L.
REv. at 1663-64.
78 See text accompanying notes 60-71 supra.
79 The exercise of supervisory power by federal courts of appeals is a relatively recent
development. Prior to McNabb, courts of appeals had "supervisory power" but the term
referred to their longstanding ability to control inferior courts through the issuance of
writs. See, e.g., Armour v. Kloeb, 109 F.2d 72, 75 (6th Cir. 1939). Courts of appeals retain
this "supervisory power" under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970). This type of
power, exercised pursuant to congressional mandate, bears no relation to intermediate
supervisory power, but courts have nonetheless confused the two doctrines. One source of
this confusion is LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), in which the Supreme
Court said: "We believe that supervisory control of the District Courts by the Courts of
Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system." Id. at 259-60.
This language is often quoted in support of the existence of intermediate supervisory
power. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 98
S. Ct. 1873 (1978). Forgotten, however, is the sentence of LaBuy that immediately follows:
"The All Writs Act confers on the Courts of Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs
of mandamus in the exceptional circumstances existing here." 352 U.S. at 260.
After McNabb, courts of appeals generally exercised derivative supervisory power and
only considered the possibility that they could independently promulgate supervisory
power rules. See, e.g., United States v. Cone, 354 F.2d 119, 124 n.10 (2d Cir. 1965) (en
banc); United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1958). The first exercise of
intermediate supervisory power seems to have been Helwig v. United States, 162 F.2d 837,
840 (6th Cir. 1947) (verdict set aside and case remanded for testimony from witness who
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foundations of the power they so freely wield.80 Judge Gurfein
may have found some support for the power in dicta drawn from
Cupp v. Naughten: s1
Within such a unitary jurisdictional framework the appellate
court will, of course, require the trial court to conform to con-
stitutional mandates, but it may likewise require it to follow pro-
cedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial
practice although in nowise commanded by statute or by the
Constitution. 82
did not testify at first trial). Intermediate supervisory power, however, did not reach its
potential until the early 1960's.
80 See note 59 and accompanying text supra. But see Schofield II, supra note 51, at 969-71
(dissenting opinion, Aldisert, J.); Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (9th
Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 483 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1973).
Several judges have questioned the existence of intermediate supervisory power. Judge
Byrne attacked the doctrine in his dissent in Burton:
Until 1943, in the Anglo-American system of justice, the rule that appellate
courts could reverse lower courts only when error was present, was never ques-
tioned. In McNabb v. United States .. .the Supreme Court announced the new
doctrine that, as the court of ultimate review, it had supervisory powers over lower
courts which permitted the reversal ofjudgments even in absence of error....
A court of appeals is not "the court of ultimate review" and its province as a
court is limited to reversing district courts only when prejudicial error is found.
Id. at 1189-90 (emphasis in original). Judge Byrne used similar language in Henry v.
United States, 432 F.2d 114, 119-20 (9th Cir. 1970), modijfied, 434 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1011 (1971). This language was excised from Henry in a per curiam mod-
ifying opinion. 434 F.2d at 1284.
81 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
821d. at 146, quoted in United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 1873 (1978). Cupp was a habeas corpus proceeding reviewing a state court
criminal conviction. The trial judge gave a "presumption of truthfulness" instruction, di-
recting the jury to presume a witness is telling the truth unless his demeanor or credibility
signified otherwise. 414 U.S. at 142. Justice Rehnquist found that courts of appeals disap-
proved of the instruction: "The appellate courts were, in effect, exercising the so-called
supervisory power of an appellate court to review proceedings of trial courts and to reverse
judgments of such courts which the appellate court concludes were wrong." Id. at 146. The
"supervisory power" discussed in this passage is not the supervisory power this Note
criticizes. In Cupp, the Court cited cases that found the "presumption of truthfulness" in-
struction to be prejudicial error and reversed on that ground. See id. at 144 n.4. Since the
prejudicial error in Cupp was not of constitutional dimension, the Court denied petitioner
habeas corpus relief. Id. at 146.
In support of intermediate supervisory power, courts of appeals have also cited Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52 (1963) (per
curiam). See United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241, 1248 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United
States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 7 n.13 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974);
Virgin Islands v. Bodle, 427 F.2d 532, 534 (3d Cir. 1970). In Barker, the Court faced the
issue of speedy trial but stated: "Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapprov-
ing a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which
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But this analysis made no attempt to explain the existence of in-
termediate supervisory power. Judge Gurfein also failed to distin-
guish between those cases where the doctrine controls purely judi-
cial concerns from those where it affects executive prerogatives.8 3
To date, no court has adequately analyzed whether courts of ap-
peals should possess independent supervisory power in the first
place.
Finally, intermediate supervisory power cannot be defended
on the ground that Congress or the Supreme Court may overturn
rules based on its exercise. Congress has rarely acted to control the
Supreme Court's use of the power;8 4 the multiplicity of rules based
on intermediate supervisory power can only add to the complexity
of congressional oversight and the likelihood of congressional inac-
tion.8 5 Nor can the prospect of Supreme Court review sustain the
doctrine. To date the Court has never directly confronted inter-
establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought." 407 U.S. at
530 n.29. The Court referred to the Second Circuit's Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition
of Criminal Cases. Id. at 523 n.18. But the Second Circuit had adopted those rules pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970) (Judicial Council). See 2d CIR. R. app. In Bartone, the Court
found plain error when the trial court improperly enlarged the petitioner's sentence. 375
U.S. at 53. The Court referred to judicial control of errors of law when stating: "[B]oth the
Courts of Appeals and this Court (McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332) have broad pow-
ers of supervision." Id. at 54.
83 547 F.2d at 776.
4 For examples of such rare congressional action, see note 4 supra.
8- One might well wonder how Congress must speak either to overturn or to preempt
an exercise of supervisory power. In United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 1873 (1978), the government argued that supervisory power could
not support the suppression of relevant evidence-the incriminating grand jury testimony
of defendant Jacobs. Id. at 776-77. The government relied upon 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1970)
(admissibility of voluntary confessions) and the Federal Rules of Evidence:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Con-
stitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
FED. R. EVID. 402 (emphasis added). Without reaching the issue, the Second Circuit disap-
proved the "extreme" position that Congress had intended to preempt exercises of super-
visory power:
It requires a good deal of stretching to say that these general statutes, in any
event, were preclusive of supervisory power which is exercised, not in derogation
of a procedural rule or statute, but for the limited purpose of preventing chaos in
criminal law administration through the presence in the same district of a two-
headed prosecution branch operating on conflicting procedures.
547 F.2d at 777. The government clearly rejects this formulation. See Brief for the United
States at 14-23, United States v. Jacobs, 98 S. Ct. 1873 (1978). Cf. United States v.
DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 985 (3d Cir. 1976) (18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970) precludes use of super-
visory power), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378,
1381 (3d Cir. 1974) (18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1970) prohibits exercise of supervisory suppres-
sion), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975).
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mediate supervisory power, 86 but has permitted inconsistencies
among the circuits to stand.87 This history unmasks judicial review
as an ineffective control.
Supervisory power has long provided circuit courts with the
ability to expand the law to satisfy their policy preferences. Courts
must, however, begin to resist the temptation to invoke this doc-
trine. The questionable legitimacy of intermediate supervisory
power, its potential for abuse, and the absence of any carefully
articulated standards for its exercise necessitate such circum-
spection. 88 Courts of appeals should confine themselves to follow-
ing the McNabb model of implementing specific congressional
policies and should focus carefully on the actors and activities po-
tentially affected by supervisory rulings. 89 Absent a clear need to
8 Research has disclosed no instance where the Supreme Court has overturned an
exercise of intermediate supervisory power. The Court recently dismissed certiorari in
United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 1873 (1978).
Courts of appeals have occasionally overturned exercises of supervisory power by district
courts as abuses of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). The Government had raised this argument inJacobs. See
Brief for the United States at 23-36, United States v. Jacobs, 98 S. Ct. 1873 (1978).
87 The best example of inconsistency among the circuits is the body of rules governing
the Allen charge. See notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra.
88 Courts should be aware of alternatives to supervisory power. For example, various
enabling acts authorize the Supreme Court to enact rules with the acquiescence of Con-
gress. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) (civil rules); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)
(criminal rules); 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970) (bankruptcy rules). The Supreme Court may
amend the Federal Rules of Evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (Supp. V 1975). Most important, 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (1970) states: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such
rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court."
Courts may also promulgate rules by judicial conference on either a nationwide or
circuit-wide basis. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970) (Judicial Conference of United States) (Chief
Justice chairs panel of Chief Judges of all circuits); 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970) (Judicial Coun-
cil) (Chief Judge of circuit chairs panel of cross-section of circuit's judges); 28 U.S.C. § 333
(1970) (Judicial Conference of Circuit) (Chief Judge of circuit chairs panel of all federal
judges within, circuit). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER,
HART & WEcHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973); Wein-
stein, supra note 74, at 905.
19 Professor Hill developed three overlapping classifications in his analysis of super-
visory power:
1. Supervisory power exercised to protect the quality of the judicial process;
2. Supervisory power triggered by government's violation of statutes; and
3. Supervisory power triggered by government actions that do not violate statutory
language but are wrong from the judicial perspective.
Hill, supra note 1, at 194. Professor Hill concludes that courts should not invoke supervi-
sory power over activities falling into category three:
[U]nder the Constitution and the governing statutes, it is, to say the least, less
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implement congressional policy, courts should not attempt to in-
vade traditionally executive concerns.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Chanen,90 recently dem-
onstrated this sensitivity when reviewing a prosecutor's presenta-
tion of hearsay evidence before a grand jury.91 Exercising super-
visory power, the district court had dismissed the indictment due to
the "fundamental unfairness" of the prosecutor's conduct. 92 The
Ninth Circuit reversed,93 recognizing the overlapping executive
and judicial functions of grand juries:
obvious that the judiciary has authority to pass independent judgment on the pro-
priety of investigational and enforcement activity of the executive branch. The
constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch in this regard are subject to a
large measure of control by Congress, but it is not clear that the courts may go
beyond the implementation of constitutional and statutory limitations.
Id. at 205 (emphasis in original).
90 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
91 The government brought defendants before a grand jury alleging a false claim
against the United States in the Court of Claims. After testimony by several witnesses, the
government neither presented an indictment nor requested a true bill. Several months
later, the government again brought defendants before a grand jury where the govern-
ment presented one witness who summarized the testimony of several witnesses at the first
grand jury. The second grand jury indicted but the indictment was dismissed because no
court reporter had been present at the second grand jury and no transcript was available.
A second ground for dismissal was the prosecution's use of hearsay evidence. A third
grand jury indicted defendants on the basis of the testimony of one witness and readings
of the transcript of the first proceeding. Exercising supervisory power, the district court
dismissed this indictment: "[A]s long as the Government presented their case live before
[the first] grand jury, . . . any subsequent grand jury should have the same opportunity."
Id. at 1308-09 (quoting district judge).
92 See id. at 1309 n.2.
9' Defendant argued that the court of appeals could reverse only upon finding abuse
of discretion because the district court had dismissed the indictment pursuant to its super-
visory power. Id. at 1312. Judge Wallace rejected this argument and limited the discretion
of the trial judge due to the close connection between the executive branch and the grand
jury:
In its broadest conceptual outlines, this case presents a conflict between the
Executive and Judicial branches of the federal government over their respective
relationships to the federal grand jury. The defendants perceive the district court
as endowed with broad discretionary powers to supervise the grand jury. By con-
trast, the government contends that "the manner of conducting grand jury pro-
ceedings lies in the discretion of the executive branch guided by law, not in the
trial court." In our view, tradition and the dynamics of the constitutional scheme
of separation of powers define a limited function for both court and prosecutor in
their dealings with the grand jury. In this case, it is the court, not the prosecutor,
which has exceeded those limits.
Id. (emphasis in original). The court found grand juries to be independent bodies not
wholly controlled by either the executive or judicial branch: "[U]nder the constitutional
scheme, the grand jury is not and should not be captive to any of the three branches." Id.
The court considered the presentation of evidence an executive function. Id.
INTERMEDIATE SUPERVISORY POWER
[G]iven the constitutionally-based independence of each of the
three actors-court, prosecutor and grand jury-we believe a
court may not exercise its "supervisory power" in a way which
encroaches on the prerogatives of the other two unless there is a
clear basis in fact and law for doing so.94
Discretionary restraint, of course, cannot excuse the lack of
theoretical and practical justification for intermediate supervisory
power. Why courts of appeals should extend procedural protec-
tions beyond constitutional requirements remains unanswered. 95
The unprincipled exercise of intermediate supervisory power has
accelerated the erosion of limited government and the separation
of powers. Only increased judicial self-restraint and effective con-
trol by the Supreme Court and Congress can halt this dangerous
trend.
L. Douglas Harris
94 Id. at 1313 (footnote omitted).
"Judge Gurfein has stated:
While we did not think the warning to be necessary on Miranda grounds, we
also did not believe that because an omission by a prosecutor is within constitu-
tional limits, he must necessarily omit that which he is constitutionally permitted to
omit. What the Constitution does not require it does not necessarily forbid.
United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 774 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 1873 (1978)
(emphasis in original).
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